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Underemployment and Job Mismatch 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Javier Herrera and Sébastien Merceron
Traditional labor market indicators fail to capture the distinctive characteris-
tics of low-income countries and the ways in which markets in those countries 
adjust. Th e absence of unemployment insurance, the importance of informal 
sector employment, and the weakness of state regulations, among other factors, 
reduce the relevance of quantity adjustments (measured by the unemployment 
rate) in these countries, where changes in the quality of employment seem to 
play an important role. 
No offi  cial indicator captures this dimension. Th is chapter tries to fi ll this gap 
by focusing on the measurement of job mismatch and its consequences on rev-
enues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e chapter posits that a key element of the adjust-
ment of supply and demand is found in changes in the quality of employment. 
Individuals who are members of households that do not have the necessary 
resources to withstand extended unemployment are forced either to create their 
own jobs or to accept wage jobs whose remuneration, skills match, social secu-
rity, job security, and other features are oft en inferior to the features of the job 
they previously held. None of the labor market indicators captures this situation. 
Th e chapter is organized into seven sections. Th e fi rst section describes the 
limitations of traditional unemployment and underemployment indicators 
given the characteristics of the labor markets in developing countries in gen-
eral and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Th e second section examines the 
literature on “overeducation” and discusses the measurement of job mismatch. 
Th e third section presents estimates on the extent of job mismatch and identifi es 
its determinants. Th e fourth section examines the impact of job mismatch on 
earnings, both in developed countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e fi  fth sec-
tion examines nonwage compensation for overeducation and undereducation. 
Th e sixth section examines wage downgrading as a pathway out of unemploy-
ment and economic inactivity. Th e last section summarizes the main fi ndings 
and analyzes their implications. 
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The Inadequacy of Standard Unemployment 
Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although work-related issues are central to economic policy debates and 
to African households’ concerns, no regional labor market diagnoses had 
been conducted until recently (see the overview for a review). Th e dearth of 
regional studies mainly refl ects gaps in primary data. Very few African coun-
tries have employment indicators (the International Labour Organization [ILO] 
LABORSTA database presents unemployment rates for just 10 African coun-
tries). Where these indicators do exist, diff erences in operational defi nitions, cov-
erage, period, and type of primary source (surveys, censuses) make the indicators 
hard to compare across countries. As a result, diff erent sources produce con-
fl icting diagnoses of employment. For example, the World Development Report 
2013: Jobs (World Bank 2013) sets the youth unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan 
Africa at less than 10 percent, the second-lowest in the world (aft er South Asia). 
Th e Economic Report on Africa 2005 paints a totally diff erent picture, estimating 
youth unemployment at about 18 percent (UNECA 2005). Th e ILO’s regional 
report (ILO 2006) also paints a bleak picture of youth unemployment. 
Th ere is a huge gap between the classic measure of unemployment on the 
one hand and underemployment and the reality of the situation as perceived 
by households in developing countries, in Africa in particular, on the other. 
Th e forms of labor market imbalances in Sub-Saharan Africa should no longer 
be assessed solely on the basis of the level of unemployment and the number 
of hours worked: the specifi cities of labor markets in Africa call for the use of 
indicators that address both the quantity and quality of jobs.
Th e unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, as in many other develop-
ing countries, is relatively low, comparable to the rate in developed countries. 
In addition, despite wide macroeconomic fl uctuations, unemployment rates 
remain fairly stable. African labor markets thus do not appear to adjust either 
solely or primarily quantitatively.
Unemployment benefi ts exist in only a few African countries, and earnings 
levels are relatively low. As a result, during downturns, households depend on 
other households—something traditional measures do not capture. Th e tradi-
tional underemployment indicator shows that the employment problem cannot 
be characterized by the existence of a large contingent of individuals working 
fewer hours than the statutory working week. In fact, on average, the number 
of weekly hours actually exceeds the statutory working week.
If the unemployment and underemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
relatively low and stable, why does employment appear to be one of the main 
challenges perceived by households? How and through what mechanisms do 
labor markets adjust in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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Serious doubts have been raised about the relevance, accuracy, and compa-
rability of the classic indicators of unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 Th e 
notion of unemployment as defi ned in the developed countries is not applicable 
in Sub-Saharan Africa because labor market characteristics there diff er. If the 
ILO defi nition of unemployment is expanded to include extended unemploy-
ment, including discouraged workers (people who are no longer actively seek-
ing a job because they fear they will not fi nd one), the unemployment rate in 
Sub-Saharan Africa rises by half to some 16 percent (see chapter 1). 
Unemployment and time-related underemployment rates (using the ILO 
defi nition) are relatively low in urban Sub-Saharan Africa: in the commer-
cial capitals of the countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU), unemployment averages 11.4 percent and time-related 
underemployment 14.3 percent (see chapter 1).2 However, polls of households 
reveal that lack of work is their main problem, and more than 40 percent of 
employed workers in West Africa report being dissatisfi ed with the job they 
hold (see chapter 3). 
Several particularities of the African economies may explain why the stan-
dard unemployment indicator is not a useful measure in Sub-Saharan Africa:
• Th ree-quarters of jobs are concentrated in the informal sector. Th ese jobs 
typically are highly insecure. Th ey provide no social security coverage and 
poor working conditions. 
• Th e absence of unemployment benefi ts and the predominance of family and 
social networks in job-seeking alters the approach to prospecting. Job-seeking 
oft en means getting together enough capital to start up a small informal, own-
account business, generally with the help of family and friends.
• Th e scale of unpaid family and child labor makes it hard to distinguish 
between work and nonwork.
• Education plays a diff erent role in access to employment. Unlike in devel-
oped countries, the level of education and the unemployment rate are 
inversely related in Sub-Saharan Africa (see chapter 5).
• Th e seasonal nature of many jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa raises a reference 
period problem.
Th ese features of African labor markets make the classic labor market evalu-
ation indicators unsuitable. Th ere is a pressing need for better indicators that 
more fully and accurately cover the reality of African employment problems. 
Measures of underemployment do a better job of capturing labor market 
imbalances. Th ey aim to quantify the number of people who are forced to work 
fewer hours or take a less skilled job in a less productive economic unit to avoid 
unemployment and who therefore earn less than they could normally earn 
(Borgen, Amundson, and Harder 1988; Hecker 1992; ILO 1997).3 
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Th e 16th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO 1998) 
decided that underemployment refl ects the underutilization of the productive 
capacity of the employed population. It is to the labor force what the underuse 
of capital is to business. Time-related underemployment refl ects the quantity of 
work rather than its quality.
On average, time-related underemployment remains low in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: 14.3 percent of employed workers in the WAEMU capitals spend less 
than 35 hours a week at their main job when they would prefer to work more.4 
Another 43 percent of employed workers work more than 48 hours a week (48 
percent among informal sector workers). 
Th e fi rst limitation of this standard time-related underemployment indicator 
is that people may work a second job to supplement their main job. Only 5.9 per-
cent of workers across the West African capitals hold a second job in addition to 
their main job, however. Th is low rate explains why including hours worked in 
the second job does very little to change the rate of time-related underemploy-
ment, which falls just 0.1 percent on average across WAEMU (0.2 percent in 
Cotonou, where the rate of multiple jobholding is at the highest, at 9.2 percent).
This notion of time-related underemployment therefore needs to be 
expanded to include measures of the quality of the work, characterized by such 
factors as low hourly earnings, the underutilization of professional skills, and 
low labor productivity resulting from the misallocation of labor resources or a 
fundamental imbalance between labor and other factors of production.5 When 
long hours are made necessary by abnormally low labor productivity or hourly 
earnings, they may also refl ect invisible underemployment. 
Minimum wage regulations are generally not relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Measuring invisible underemployment in terms of underpayment calls for 
hourly income norms by type of occupation, rather than just a legal minimum 
income that is uniform for all individuals.
Invisible underemployment measures the shortfall in productivity, which 
can be measured at the worker level: individuals may work at jobs that do 
not require them to use their skills or human capital (Becker 1975). Profes-
sional match analysis compares job quality with individuals’ expectations and 
characteristics. 
Job Mismatch
Job mismatch is the deviation between a worker’s skill level and the level 
required by the job. It covers two situations. Th e terms skill-related under-
employment, downgrading, and overeducation refer to workers who are forced 
to accept jobs for which they are overqualifi ed or that do not match their skills 
or training. Th e terms underqualifi cation and undereducation refer to workers 
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who hold jobs for which they are not qualifi ed enough: in a dysfunctional labor 
market, applicants may be hired based on their social network rather than their 
abilities. Both concepts are based on norms that may change over time and space.
Th e Economic Literature on Overeducation 
Job mismatch exists in developed economies, where many people have many 
years of education. In France, for example, nearly one in fi ve employees reported 
that their education did not match their job in 1996, a consequence of the fl ood 
of graduates (Bodier and Crenner 1997). 
Many economists have addressed overeducation. Freeman (1976), one of 
the earliest, endeavored to explain the downgrading of graduates in the United 
States by the oversupply of graduates, challenging the principle of an automatic 
link between qualifi cations and economic success.
Human capital theory posits that workers are paid commensurate with their 
level of productivity, which is directly dependent on the level of human capital 
(education, work experience, training, seniority, skills, and all other unobservable 
competencies) (Becker 1975). In a fl exible labor market, overeducation would 
be a purely transitional phase of adaptation, during which individuals need to 
compensate for their lack of other human capital endowments (that is, the lack 
of experience of young graduate workers) (Groot 1996). Sicherman (1991) fi nds 
that overeducated workers change jobs more oft en, suggesting that overeducation 
is part of a phase of adaptation to the fi rst stages of a career. Rubb (2003a) posits 
that overeducation may be a short-run phenomenon for individuals but a long-
run phenomenon for the economy. Individuals who take a break in their careers, 
such as women who have children, are more likely to hold a job for which they 
are overeducated because of their lack of experience (Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink 2000). Older workers off set their lack of training with more experience. 
Th e job competition model (Th urow 1975) posits that an individual’s 
employability is inversely proportional to the training costs required aft er his 
or her recruitment. He believes that employers’ decisions to hire one individual 
over another are dictated by the training costs they will have to pay to make the 
individual operational. Th e more educated individuals are at the point of hir-
ing, the lower these costs will be and the greater their chances of being hired. 
From this point of view, employers may end up hiring individuals with higher 
levels of education than strictly required for the position; workers therefore 
fi nd themselves overeducated for their jobs. Candidates in the queues for each 
job in an environment of high unemployment have to choose between being 
unemployed and reducing their reservation wage. Professional downgrading 
(overeducation) is therefore a defense against unemployment and the deci-
sion to remain unemployed a defense against downgrading. Th e lengthening of 
education is therefore making education an essentially defensive investment to 
keep one’s place in the queue for the desired job. Overeducation in this model 
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is therefore associated more with macroeconomic circumstances and long-run 
disequilibria than the human capital life cycle.
Empirical research in developed countries has shown that overeducated 
individuals earn more than their counterparts with appropriate qualifi cations 
doing the same job but less than similarly educated individuals employed in 
jobs for which they are not overqualifi ed (Sicherman 1991; Cohn and Khan 
1995; Verdugo and Verdugo 1989; Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000). As 
Rubb (2003b p. 621), notes, “On average, the literature fi nds that the premium 
paid for overeducation is about equal to the penalty for undereducation, but 
lower than the returns associated with an increase in required education.” 
Very little research has been conducted in developing countries, especially 
Africa, on job mismatch and overeducation. Th e only empirical studies are by 
Simon and Stark (2007) on overqualifi cation as a result of international migra-
tion, by Herrera (2005) on Peru, and by Esteves and Martins (2007) on Brazil. 
Measuring Job Mismatch 
Th e literature identifi es four main ways of measuring the level of education 
required for a given job (and therefore overeducation and undereducation) 
(Hartog 2000). “Subjective” methods are based on workers’ self-assessment. 
“Objective” methods are based on experts’ job analysis or realized matches.6 
Realized matches measure the diff erence between the education attained and 
the dominant level of education observed for the studied worker’s occupation. 
It can be defi ned in terms of years of education (a method developed by Clogg 
[1979] and Clogg and Shockey [1984], called the Clogg indicator) or education 
levels (an approach developed by de Grip, Borghans, and Smits [1998], called 
the de Grip indicator). Individuals are overeducated if the number of years 
(level) of education is greater than or equal to the central value that defi nes 
the norm. Individuals have an inadequate match if the observed number of 
years of education is more than one standard deviation from the mean or two 
standard deviations from the median number of years of education observed 
in the occupation for the reference population. In the case of education lev-
els, the norm is defi ned in terms of the dominant level of education for each 
occupation.7
Each method has advantages and drawbacks. Self-assessment by workers has 
the advantage of providing education norms directly at the local level. However, 
individuals tend to subjectively infl ate the level required for their job and over-
estimate the level of their position. 
Th e choice of method is dictated above all by the availability of data. Many 
authors rely on experts’ analysis of job qualifi cations, which provides an objec-
tive, clear, and fairly unbiased measurement of the levels of education required 
by fi rms for a given position. No such evaluations exist in developing coun-
tries. Th e method based on realized matches yields the balance between labor 
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supply and demand; it does not measure the level of education required by 
fi rms  (Hartog 2000). In general, endogenous measurements based on the gen-
eral trend (such as the modal, median, and mean values) do not refl ect each 
job’s required level of education when the economy (or sector) is in a situation 
of underemployment or overemployment (ILO 1997). 
Constructing a Job Mismatch Indicator
Th e compilation of surveys conducted in the capitals of nine African countries 
covering more than 100,000 people allows for the fi rst-ever large-scale estima-
tion of empirical educational norms at a detailed (three-digit) occupational clas-
sifi cation level and a robust deduction of the job mismatch level and profi les. Th e 
data come from the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in seven West African countries 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) between 
2001 and 2002; in the administrative capital (Yaoundé) and economic capital 
(Douala) of Cameroon (2005); and in the capital of Madagascar (Antanana-
rivo 2001–04).8 Th e questionnaires used were identical, and the same collection 
methodology, data processing, and variable coding were used to facilitate their 
compilation and consolidate the estimates. 
Th e economic and monetary integration of the WAEMU countries studied 
guarantees strong homogeneousness within the population concerned, worker 
mobility in the region, and, therefore, the relevance of the norms and indicators 
developed throughout the region in this study. It allows analysis of questions 
regarding the impact of the job mismatch on earnings. 
Th e focus in this chapter is on employed workers 15 and older living in urban 
areas. However, it is useful to restrict the reference population to adults old 
enough to have fi nished their schooling (that is, people 25–44). Th e restricted 
sample includes 18,000 paid workers, representative of about 3.6 million people 
aft er weighting. Th e occupations are aggregated into 70 categories covering all 
the jobs on the labor market in the cities concerned.
Th e realized matches method was used to measure overqualifi cation or 
underqualifi cation by profession (that is, the distribution of levels of education 
by occupation was used to estimate an endogenous qualifi cation norm for each 
of the professions). Doing so entailed fi rst estimating the reference qualifi cation 
norm for each type of profession. Th e overqualifi cation indictor is measured by 
the proportion of workers with a qualifi cation level greater than the normative 
threshold estimated for the profession concerned. 
Estimating the Extent of Job Mismatch 
For all professions and all cities together, 14.8 percent of workers 15 and older 
are undereducated based on Clogg’s continuous indicator (25.0 percent based 
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Table 2.1 Clogg and de Grip Measures of Job Mismatch in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(percent)
Discrete indicator 
(de Grip)
Continuous indicator (Clogg)
Job match
Job mismatch
All
Undereducation Overeducation
Undereducation
Extreme 
undereducation Overeducation
Extreme 
overeducation
Job match 47.9 1.6 0.0 4.1 0.1 53.7
Undereducation 11.5 11.9 1.4 0.3 0.0 25.0
Overeducation 5.1 0.0 0.0 13.4 2.7 21.3
All 64.5 13.4 1.4 17.9 2.8 100.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: Cameroon 2005 (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation [DIAL] and National Statistics Institute [NSI]); Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2005 (DIAL and NSI); Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique [INSTAT]); West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 
(Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne [AFRISTAT], DIAL, and NSI).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older.
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Figure 2.1 Incidence of Job Mismatch (Clogg Indicator) for 10 Countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
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on de Grip’s discrete indicator) (table 2.1). Th e share of the labor force that is 
overeducated is 20.7 percent based on the continuous indicator and 21.3 per-
cent based on the discrete indicator. For developed countries, Groot (1996) 
estimates undereducation at 21.8 percent and overeducation at 16.0 percent, 
Cohn and Khan (1995) estimate undereducation at 12 percent and overeduca-
tion at 13 percent, and Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) estimate undereducation 
at 9.9 percent and overeducation at 10.9 percent. A meta-analysis of the litera-
ture reveals an average incidence of 14.4 percent for undereducation and 23.3 
percent for overeducation in Western Europe and the United States (Groot and 
Maassen van den Brink 2000). Th e estimate for Sub-Saharan Africa using the 
Clogg method is similar.9
Th e Clogg and de Grip measures of overeducation are similar (20.7 per-
cent and 21.3 percent of occupied individuals). A larger discrepancy is evident 
in undereducation, where the indicators diff er by about 10 percentage points 
(14.8 percent according to Clogg’s indicator, 25.0 percent according to de Grip’s 
indicator). Th e correlation coeffi  cient between the two indicators is 0.77, which 
means that both indicators capture the phenomenon fairly well.10 
Th e Clogg continuous indicator is more restrictive in its job mismatch mea-
surement than the discrete indicator (fi gure 2.1). It estimates that 64.5 percent 
of people hold jobs that match their level of education. Th e de Grip measure 
estimates this fi gure at 53.7 percent. 
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Identifying the Determinants of Job Mismatch 
A multivariate nonlinear econometric model is used to identify the eff ect of 
each explanatory variable on job mismatch aft er controlling for bivariate eff ects 
caused by the other explanatory variables observed. Th e specifi cation of a mul-
tinomial or ordered logit model seemed most appropriate, because it can simul-
taneously estimate the probability of overeducation and undereducation. Th e 
choice of an ordered or unordered model depends on the type of dependent 
variable and whether there is a possibility of ranking the variable’s categories. 
As there is no unequivocal order between the dependent variable’s categories, 
an unordered model is used here.11
Th e explanatory variables in the model cover individual characteristics, 
household characteristics, and characteristics of the business and the job held. 
Th e dependent variable is Clogg’s continuous indicator. It was chosen in order 
to reduce the risk of endogeneity in the model introduced by the presence of 
qualitative education variables as explanatory variables (education dummy vari-
able). Th is education variable sharply increases the model’s explanatory power 
and reveals that the probability of being overeducated increases with the level 
of education.12
Table 2.2 presents the results of the multinomial model. In most cases, a sig-
nifi cant variable for overeducation (such as the size of the business in which the 
Table 2.2 Job Mismatch Modeling Results for 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(multinomial logit model)
Variable Undereducated Overeducated
Type of business (reference = self-employment [1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) 1.34*** 0.81***
Small business (6–20 people) 1.64*** 0.43***
Large business (>20 people) 1.64*** 0.41***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant 1.26*** 0.99
Rural migrant 1.12** 0.96
Foreigner 1.20*** 1.04
Jobholding and time-related underemployment
Multiple jobholder (reference = one job) 0.80*** 1.18**
Time-related underemployment (reference = no 
time-related underemployment)
0.90*** 0.92**
Education (reference = no education or informal education)
Primary education 0.10*** 0.13***
Lower-secondary education 0.01*** 39.54***
(continued next page)
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Upper-secondary education 0.01*** 346.92***
Higher education 0.01*** 726.20***
Position in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse 1.01 1.04
Secondary household member 0.88*** 1.06
Marital status and gender
Couple (married or unmarried) (reference = single) 0.70*** 1.04
Male (reference = female) 1.38*** 1.21***
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector 1.80*** 0.93
Primary sector 1.89*** 1.28***
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector 0.86 1.48***
Formal private sector 0.83* 1.23***
Age
Age 0.97*** 1.07***
Age squared 1.001*** 0.999***
Cohort (reference = 50+)
Young cohort (10–29) 0.81** 1.01
Medium cohort (30–49) 0.98 1.03
Religion (reference = other)
Christian 0.41*** 2.33***
Muslim 0.43*** 2.67***
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business 1.00 0.99***
City (reference = aggregate of Douala and Yaoundé)
Abidjan 1.61*** 0.53***
Antananarivo 7.19*** 0.41***
Bamako 1.54*** 0.38***
Cotonou 1.94*** 0.47***
Lomé 0.87 0.93
Niamey 1.47*** 0.33***
Ouagadougou 1.16 0.49***
Constant 1.60 0.001
Number of observations 61,984 61,984
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 10 and older. Dakar was dropped because of collinearity.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2.2 (continued)
Variable Undereducated Overeducated
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individual works) is also signifi cant for undereducation. A “confusion matrix” 
is used to evaluate the quality of the model by comparing the predicted values 
with the true values of the indicator. Th e correct classifi cation rate—the ratio of 
the number of correct predictions to the sample size—is 74 percent.13 
Several fi ndings emerge from the data in table 2.2: 
• Th e probability of being overeducated (undereducated) increases (decreases) 
as the level of education increases (decreases). Th e higher a worker’s quali-
fi cations, the greater his or her risk of being overqualifi ed for the job he or 
she holds. 
• Internal migrants have a greater probability than nonmigrants of holding 
a job that requires more education than they have. Th e fact that on aver-
age they are less educated than the native population probably refl ects their 
lower access to the education system, despite recent decentralization and 
deconcentration eff orts in most African countries.
• Foreign migrants also have a higher probability of being undereducated: the 
role of social capital (social and community networks of migrants living in 
the country’s main city) appears to come into play here. Moreover, a selec-
tion bias exists for migrants: other unobservable characteristics explain the 
fact that for a given level of education, migrants are more likely to occupy 
jobs that require education levels higher than those they have attained. We 
fi nd no statistically signifi cant support to the stylized fact posited by Simon 
and Stark (2007) that overeducation in developing countries is the result of 
international migration. 
• Members of the oldest cohort are more likely to be undereducated than mem-
bers of younger cohorts, because the qualifi cation norms (level of education) 
for a given occupation were lower when they entered the labor market.
• Aft er controlling for cohort eff ects (and therefore diff erential access to edu-
cation by generation), age increases the chances of being overeducated, in 
a nonlinear manner (both age and age squared are signifi cant). As age is 
closely related to potential experience, it may be individuals’ potential expe-
rience (and not age) that positively infl uences the probability of being over-
educated. Th is paradoxical result would tend to invalidate the stylized fact 
noted by Sicherman (1991) and Freeman (1976) that individuals become 
overeducated in order to compensate for the lack of human capital endow-
ments, such as experience and training. What is being measured here is the 
age eff ect within a cohort (age bracket); the cohort eff ect is wholly in line 
with human capital theory.
• Working in the informal sector increases the chances of being overeducated. 
Th is fi nding can be explained by the fact that the informal sector does not off er 
suffi  ciently skilled work because of lack of access to technology and capital. 
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• Men have a higher probability than women of being undereducated or 
overeducated.
• Overeducation is positively correlated with job dissatisfaction. Th is fi nd-
ing comes not from the estimation of the multinomial model but from the 
simple study of the coeffi  cient for the correlation between the dichotomous 
overeducation variable and the variable covering job satisfaction as reported 
by the individual. Th e correlation (0.18) is positive. Th e job satisfaction vari-
able is not introduced into the model as an explanatory variable because of 
the high risk of endogeneity: although overqualifi cation can clearly generate 
job dissatisfaction, job dissatisfaction (measured by the desire to change a 
job) can infl uence the probability of a job mismatch.
Having a high level of education, being a man, and belonging to a young 
cohort are correlated with overeducation; having a low level of education, being 
a migrant, being a woman, and working in a very small business are correlated 
with undereducation. 
Impacts of Job Mismatch: Premium or Penalty? 
Does wage or nonwage compensation exist for job mismatch? Are overedu-
cated individuals paid more or less than matched individuals, aft er control-
ling for the eff ects of other individual characteristics? Do they have more 
stable jobs? 
Impact of Job Mismatch on Earnings in Developed Countries
Human capital is defi ned as the stock of productive capacities an individual 
acquires (through the accumulation of general and specifi c knowledge, know-
how, and so forth) (Becker 1975). Investment in human capital is an individual 
choice resulting from the cost-benefi t trade-off  between the costs (out-of-pocket 
cost of education and opportunity cost of going to school rather than working) 
and the future discounted earnings that can be generated by additional educa-
tion. Individuals may choose to invest in order to raise their future productivity 
and therefore their earnings. Human capital theory assumes that individuals are 
paid in accordance with their productivity level at work and that this marginal 
productivity is determined more by the components of human capital (educa-
tion, training, experience, skills, and so forth) than by the characteristics of the 
job (Mincer 1974; Becker 1975). 
Becker posits that wage growth over a career more or less refl ects the accu-
mulation of human capital. He believes it to be concave: gross investment tends 
to decline with age, because any wage increase raises the opportunity cost and 
the return diminishes with age, because there are fewer years available in which 
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to make the investment pay off . Th us, from a human capital point of view, the 
rates of return on investment in education are expected to be positive: the more 
an individual has studied, the higher his or her earnings. 
Th e results of 11 studies on diff erent countries reviewed by Card (2001) 
suggest that the marginal returns to education estimated by the instrumental 
variables method were 6–10 percent. As with any investment, the returns to 
education diminish: the more an individual studies, the smaller the margin 
gain in earnings for each additional year of studies. Kuépié, Nordman, and 
Roubaud (2009; see also chapter 5 of this book) invalidate this assumption 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, fi nding that private returns to education are convex 
for workers in the West African capitals. Spence (1973) notes that, as human 
capital is hard for others to perceive, qualifi cations form a credible signal of 
the worker’s level of productivity for an employer in a situation of informa-
tion asymmetry. Wages in this case are essentially contingent upon the level 
of qualifi cations.
Impact of Job Mismatch on Earnings in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Individual earnings are modeled to identify the eff ect of overeducation and 
undereducation on the level of earnings, controlling for the classic explanatory 
eff ects. For this purpose, Mincer’s model can be extended as follows: 
 lnYs = c + rS + aE + bE2 + ∑diXi + f1. UNDER + f2 OVER + u (2. 1)
where the Xi cover observable demographic characteristics (gender, ethnic 
group, religion, migratory status, father’s socioeconomic group); OVER is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is overeducated for the job 
he or she holds and 0 if not; and UNDER is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the individual is undereducated for the job he or she holds and 0 if not.
Th e estimations of lnY based solely on observed earnings therefore need to 
take selection bias into account (Heckman 1979). Aft er estimating a selection 
model (on the probability of working a paid job), we incorporate the Mills ratio 
into the earnings models to correct for selection bias. 
Use of the standard ordinary least squares method is potentially problematic 
when estimating returns to education (and therefore returns to overeducation), 
because of the endogenous nature of education (that is, its correlation with the 
earnings equation residuals because of unobservable individual characteristics). 
In principle, this endogeneity can be overcome using the instrumental variable 
procedure, which consists of fi nding variables that are assumed to be correlated 
with education but not earnings. In practice, no convincing instrument (that 
had not already been used as an explanatory variable in the model) was found. 
Earnings Model 1 proposes inserting job mismatch (undereducation and 
overeducation) dummy variables into Mincer’s equation. Th is log-linear 
regression model of hourly earnings is initially tested on all adults 25–44. Two 
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additional estimations are made, for men and for women (table 2.3). Th e model 
yields the following results:
• A (small) penalty for overeducation and a premium for undereducation is evi-
dent aft er controlling for the level of education and selection biases. Overedu-
cated individuals earn more than individuals in the same occupation with an 
appropriate level of education for the job, but they earn less than individuals 
with the same level of education working in better jobs. Th e penalty or pre-
mium associated with the job mismatch is smaller among women than men.
Table 2.3 Heckman-Corrected Mincerian Earnings Equation with Overeducation and 
Undereducation Variables for Men and Women in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(log of hourly earnings) 
Variable All Men Women 
Job mismatch (reference = job match)
Undereducated (discrete indicator) 0.179*** 0.187*** 0.159***
Overeducated (discrete indicator) –0.0901*** –0.0945*** –0.0547
Years of education 0.0820*** 0.0799*** 0.0770***
Size of business (reference = self-employment [1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) 0.1510*** 0.0645*** 0.2000***
Small business (6–20 people) 0.263*** 0.138*** 0.516***
Large business (>20 people) 0.418*** 0.281*** 0.740***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant –0.0378** –0.0319 –0.0387
Migrant from the rural exodus –0.0615** –0.0493 –0.0756*
Foreign migrant 0.01250 0.00355 0.02180
Jobholding and time-related underemployment 
Multiple jobholder (reference = one job) –0.0291 –0.0377 –0.0219
Time-related underemployment (reference = no time-
related underemployment)
0.640*** 0.666*** 0.635***
Position in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse –0.208*** –0.262 –0.146***
Secondary household member –0.200*** –0.204*** –0.179***
Marital status and gender 
Couple (married or unmarried) (reference = single) 0.0602*** 0.0565** 0.0432
Male (reference = female) 0.320*** — —
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector 0.0942** 0.1280** 0.0440
Primary sector –0.00367 0.0247 –0.0231
(continued next page)
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• Th e penalty for overeducation and the premium for undereducation do not 
off set each other: undereducation is much more profi table than overeduca-
tion is costly (in the log-linear model, the parameter corresponding to over-
education is twice as high in absolute value as the parameter corresponding 
to the undereducation dummy variable). Th is fi nding is diff erent from what 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) report for developed countries
• Th e penalty (premium) for overeducation (undereducation) is smaller than 
the returns to high levels of education. Th e returns to education are positive 
and high (8 percent), for both women and men.
Th e model was also estimated using the number of surplus (defi cit) years 
of education the individual has above (below) the norm for the years of educa-
tion required for the occupation (Model 2 [not shown]). Th is model allows 
estimation of the returns to years of overeducation. Th e results confi rm that 
the returns to required education are positive and large: one additional year 
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector –0.352*** –0.308*** –0.454***
Formal private sector –0.181*** –0.155*** –0.227**
Age
Age 0.0328 0.0341 0.0215
Age squared –0.000348 –0.000310 –0.000244
Religion (reference = other)
Christian 0.0129 –0.0145 0.0278
Muslim 0.0553* 0.0444 0.0491
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business 0.0199*** 0.0182*** 0.0202***
Selection model: Probability of participation
Cohabiting couple (married or unmarried) 
(reference = single)
0.313*** 0.349*** 0.207***
Age 0.0281*** 0.0267*** 0.0266***
Male (reference = female) –0.109*** — —
Number of earners in household 0.571*** 0.540*** 0.651***
Number of children in household 0.0514*** 0.0323** 0.0860***
Total number of people in household (excluding visitors) –0.166*** –0.157*** –0.183***
Constant –3.324*** –0.173 –0.157
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2.3 (continued)
Variable All Men Women 
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of required education (which enables the worker to hold a job demanding one 
more year of schooling) generates a 10.1 percent increase in the hourly earn-
ings logarithm, for both men and women. Each year of education beyond the 
required schooling norm for the occupation generates additional earnings (by 
6.2 percent in the hourly earnings logarithm); each year of education short 
of the normal length of schooling for the occupation decreases earnings (by 
5.1 percent in the hourly earnings logarithm). Th e return to years of overeduca-
tion is thus positive but lower than the return to years of required education. As 
in Model 1, undereducated individuals earn a premium over their colleagues in 
the same occupation with the level of education required for the job. Model 2 
erases the asymmetry revealed in Model 1 between the overeducation penalty 
and the undereducation premium: the results for the two components are simi-
lar in Model 2. By way of comparison, the meta-analysis conducted by Groot 
and Maassen van den Brink (2000) estimates the average returns to one year of 
overeducation in developed countries at 3 percent. 
Th e results of the two models bear out the results of Verdugo and Verdugo 
(1989), Groot (1996), and Hartog (2000) for developed countries: overeduca-
tion generates a penalty and undereducation a premium once the eff ects of 
required education, selection biases, and other sociodemographic variables are 
controlled for.
Underemployment and Nonwage Compensation
In developed countries, nonwage benefi ts oft en compensate individuals who 
are overeducated for the position they hold (for a discussion of compensating 
diff erential theory, see chapter 4). Th is section examines whether nonwage com-
pensation exists in Sub-Saharan Africa in the form of increased job security. 
Insecurity (the risk of losing one’s job) can be measured across an array 
of variables refl ecting the extent of formality linking employee to employer: 
the existence or absence of a written contract that protects the employee; the 
existence of a payslip; social security coverage; the steady or unsteady nature of 
the work done (casual, temporary, or steady); access to a union; and so forth. 
Th e choice of components for this indicator was determined by the availability 
of data. 
Workers are classifi ed as dependent (wage-earners) or independent (own 
account, managers, and employers). Th e insecurity score for dependent work-
ers is the arithmetic sum of the values of three variables: contract (long-term 
written contract, short-term written contract, oral contract, no contract); pay-
slip; and steadiness (steady, casual, or temporary). For independent workers, 
the presence of written accounts captures the extent of the business’s formality 
(and therefore its sustainability). Apprentices were excluded from the analysis.
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Th e job mismatch indicators (Clogg’s continuous indicator covering three 
to fi ve categories and de Grip’s discrete indicator covering three categories) 
and the insecurity score are negatively correlated.14 Th is correlation suggests 
that overeducated workers are indeed compensated with greater job security 
(table 2.4). 
To analyze the net eff ects of job mismatch on insecurity (by controlling 
for other infl uential variables), it would be preferable to conduct an ordered 
multinomial logistic regression (because the score values are discrete, whole, 
and ordered). However, the number of categories in this score (six) makes the 
analysis and interpretation tricky and the conclusions hazy. For this reason, a 
simple linear regression of the insecurity score on the classic explanatory vari-
ables (from the corrected Mincer equation) and the overeducation and under-
education dummy variables (measured by the Clogg continuous indicator, for 
example) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is presented (table 2.5). 
It would have been desirable to address the possible endogeneity of the job mis-
match in the explanation of the level of insecurity using an instrumental variable 
procedure, but no instrument was found to be conclusive. 
Given the construction of the insecurity indicator, it appears preferable to 
concentrate on a split (dependent/independent) interpretation of the results. 
Th e results of the regression model show that for dependent workers, other 
things equal, the insecurity score (and hence the level of job insecurity) 
increases with overeducation and decreases with undereducation. Th is result 
means that aft er controlling for the level of completed education (in particu-
lar), the level of job security of overeducated workers is actually higher. For 
independent workers, the explanatory variables associated with job mismatch 
are not signifi cant. Th is phenomenon is therefore of concern to employees, not 
employers or self-account workers. 
Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix between Job Mismatch and Insecurity Indicators in 10 Cities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Variable
Continuous job mismatch indicator 
(Clogg indicator)
Discrete job 
mismatch indicator 
(de Grip indicator)
Five categories Three categories Three categories
Insecurity of dependent 
workers –0.09 –0.17 –0.12
Insecurity of independent 
workers –0.07 –0.15 –0.15
Insecurity score –0.08 –0.22 –0.18
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older. 
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Table 2.5 Insecurity Score Equation with Overeducation and Undereducation Variables for 
Dependent and Independent Workers in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ordinary least squares) 
Variable All
Dependent 
workers
Independent 
workers
Job mismatch (reference = job match)
Undereducated (continuous indicator) –0.0807*** –0.2000*** 0.0322
Overeducated (continuous indicator) 0.2210*** 0.1980*** 0.0716
Size of business (reference = self-employment 
[1 person])
Microbusiness (2–5 people) –0.3090*** –0.2220*** –0.0775***
Medium-size business (6–20 people) –0.815*** –0.559*** –0.297***
Large business (>20 people) –1.426*** –1.152*** –1.599***
Migrant status (reference = native)
Interurban migrant –0.0318 –0.0547* 0.0302
Migrant from the rural exodus 0.00259 –0.02680 0.06090**
Foreigner 0.0385 0.0536 0.0594**
Jobholding and time-related underemployment
Multiple jobholder 0.0867** 0.0800 0.0331
Time-related underemployment 0.332*** 0.478*** 0.227***
Education (reference = no education or informal 
education)
Primary –0.1060*** –0.2570*** 0.0111
Lower-secondary –0.27900*** –0.49000*** –0.00262
Upper-secondary –0.673*** –0.892*** –0.212***
Higher –0.977*** –1.247*** –0.408***
Standing in household (reference = head of household)
Head of household’s spouse 0.0979*** 0.1190** 0.0533*
Secondary household member 0.06940** 0.15500*** –0.00527
Marital status and gender 
Couple (married or unmarried)(reference = single) –0.0880*** –0.1040*** –0.0882***
Male (reference = female) 0.1320*** 0.1790*** 0.0416*
Sector (reference = secondary sector)
Tertiary sector –0.348*** –0.445*** –0.346***
Primary sector –0.240*** –0.449*** –0.312***
Sector (reference = public sector)
Informal sector 1.363*** 0.894*** 1.752***
Formal private sector 0.371*** 0.258*** 0.513***
(continued next page)
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Wage Downgrading as a Pathway Out of 
Unemployment or Economic Inactivity
Th e decision to remain unemployed can be interpreted as resistance to down-
grading and skill-related underemployment. Conversely, overeducation can be 
interpreted as resistance to unemployment. Examination of an overeducated 
jobholder’s previous situation (similar job or unemployment) was used to evalu-
ate the likelihood of this hypothesis. Table 2.6 presents the results.
A Chi-squared test rejects (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis of indepen-
dence between the mobility variable change between the employed worker’s 
previous situation and current employment and the job mismatch indicator 
(Clogg indicator).
Relative to individuals in a job match situation, proportionally more over-
educated individuals were upwardly mobile (that is, moved up socioeconomi-
cally since their previous job or completion of studies). Th is fi nding could 
refl ect the theory of the human capital life cycle, which states that individuals 
temporarily hold a series of jobs below their level in order to accumulate experi-
ence and know-how that prepare them to apply for positions more in keeping 
with their qualifi cations.
A slightly smaller than average proportion of overeducated workers is unem-
ployed or out of the labor force just before holding their current job. Th is fi nd-
ing contradicts the economic intuition that overeducation oft en follows a period 
of unemployment. Th is question calls for further examination of the determi-
nants of professional mobility.
Age
Age –0.01530*** –0.03220*** –0.00571
Age squared 0.000166*** 0.000318*** 0.0000532
Religion (reference = other)
Christian –0.0112 –0.0645 0.0318
Muslim 0.0214 –0.0104 0.0792*
Seniority in the business
Seniority in the business –0.00750*** –0.01940*** –0.00262**
R 2 0.59 0.50 0.61
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 15 and older. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 2.5 (continued)
Variable All
Dependent 
workers
Independent 
workers
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Th e long-term unemployed (people unemployed for more than a year) 
appear to be less particular than the short-term unemployed about the match 
between the job and their qualifi cations: just 29 percent of the long-term unem-
ployed seek a job that corresponds to their training or their trade, as opposed 
to 37 percent of the short-term unemployed (table 2.7). Th is simple empirical 
result validates the theory that a mismatch occurs in the event of a strong risk 
of unemployment and a long period of unemployment: the longer the period of 
unemployment, the more the unemployed reduce their reservation wage and 
the skill level of the job they will apply for.
Conclusion
Th e special features of its labor markets—the lack of unemployment benefi ts, 
the predominance of the informal sector, the prevalence of personal networks 
to obtain jobs, the low unemployment rate, and so forth—make the classic 
Table 2.6 Labor Market Status before Current Employment in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(percent)
Situation before current 
employment
Situation in current employment
Undereducated Job match Overeducated All
Unemployed/inactive 61.8 64.2 61.8 63.2
Previous employment
Held better job 3.4 8.2 22.0 7.3
Held worse job 3.8 4.9 3.9 4.4
Held similar job 31.0 22.7 12.3 25.1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44.
Table 2.7 Type of Job Sought by the Unemployed in 10 Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
by Length of Unemployment 
(percent)
Job sought
Long-term 
unemployed
Short-term 
unemployed
Total 
unemployed
Job corresponding to trade or training 29.4 36.6 31.0
Job in another trade or sector 16.1 15.7 16.0
Indifferent 54.5 47.7 53.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 2.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for working individuals 25–44.
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indicators of unemployment and time-related underemployment inappro-
priate, if not misleading, for understanding labor markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Th e harmonized job mismatch measurement captures these as yet 
unmeasured aspects by concentrating on underutilization of productive 
capacities. Job mismatch should be considered an extension of the under-
employment notion. 
Overeducation—measured as the gap between individual qualifi cations and 
the qualifi cations usually required for the job held—is not confi ned to devel-
oped countries: it aff ects 21 percent of workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Men, 
older people, migrants, workers in the informal sector, the uneducated, and the 
highly educated are more likely than other workers to fi nd their job mismatched 
with their education. 
Job mismatch aff ects both earnings and job insecurity: other things equal, 
workers who are overeducated for the work they do have less job security than 
workers whose qualifi cations match their job and workers who are under-
educated for their jobs. Th e job mismatch evolves over the course of a career, 
with overqualifi cation following economic inactivity, unemployment, or more 
extreme overeducation.
Th e analysis makes a case for the widespread harmonization of job quality 
indicators and the extension of the inadequate employment measurement. Th e 
empirical methods used here need to be compared with other measurement 
methods, such as the expert job analysis method, which is more focused on 
business demand for qualifi cations and workers’ own declarations, which are 
more subjective but easier to set up.
Notes
 1. In its 2006 evaluation of African labor markets, the World Bank identifi ed four prob-
lems: the dearth of data, lack of comparability, measurement problems, and low 
relevance for low-income countries.
 2. Th e ILO defi nition of unemployment (1997) corresponds to workers who did not 
work (even one hour) in the seven days preceding the survey, who sought work 
during the previous month, and who are available to work. Time-related underem-
ployment covers gainfully employed workers whose working week is shorter than 
the statutory working week and who would like to work more.
 3. Th is type of situation used to be called disguised unemployment (Robinson 1937).
 4. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not administrative capitals, we refer to them as 
capitals because they are the most important economic centers in their countries 
(Cotonou is also the seat of government).
 5. Th is extension used to be called invisible underemployment, which the ILO described 
as “primarily an analytical concept refl ecting a misallocation of labour resources 
or a fundamental imbalance between labour and other factors of  production. 
 Characteristic symptoms might be low income, underutilization of skill, and low 
productivity. Analytical studies of invisible underemployment should be directed to 
the examination and analysis of a wide variety of data, including income and skill 
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levels (disguised underemployment) and productivity measures (potential under-
employment)” (ILO 1982, pp. 52–53).
 6. Th urow and Lucas (1972), Hartog (1980), and others use the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (U.S. Department of Labor) to measure overeducation.
 7. De Grip developed an algorithm to identify the dominant (qualitative) level of edu-
cation for each type of occupation. Depending on the distribution of the types of 
education within the given occupation, the dominant type of education is either the 
most commonly occurring or a combination of two or three levels grouped together. 
Th e algorithm had some fl aws, which are corrected for here (de Grip, Borghans, and 
Smits 1998). 
 8. For a description of 1-2-3 surveys, see box O.1 in the overview. Cameroon and Mad-
agascar were included because their labor markets are very similar to labor markets 
in West Africa (see chapter 1).
 9. Th e fact that the share of overeducated people in Europe and the United States is 
similar to the share in Sub-Saharan Africa does not mean that the levels of education 
are similar. Th e level of education in Africa is still much lower than in the developed 
countries.
 10. If we use the mean instead of the median to estimate the norms when building the 
continuous indicator, the correlation factor rises to 86 percent.
 11. Stata’s test of independence on the logit procedure returns a positive and signifi cant 
result.
 12. Th e fi nal model estimated aims to be as sparing as possible. Th e explanatory vari-
ables ultimately chosen for the model are selected by a procedure of gradual elimina-
tion of the variables or categories with the least explanatory power.
 13. In the absence of an additional test sample, this confusion matrix was constructed 
from the data used to build the model. Th is evaluation could therefore be criticized 
for being overly optimistic.
 14. Clogg’s fi ve ordered categories are –2 (extreme undereducation), –1 (undereduca-
tion), 0 (match), 1 (overeducation), 2 (extreme overeducation). De Grip’s three cat-
egories are undereducation, job match, and overeducation. 
References
Becker, G. S. 1975. Human Capital: A Th eoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Ref-
erence to Education, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bodier, M., and E. Crenner. 1997. “Adéquation entre formation et emploi: ce qu’en 
pensent les salariés.” INSEE Première 525 (June): 1–4.
Borgen, W. A., N. E. Amundson, and H. G. Harder. 1988. “Th e Experience of Underem-
ployment.” Journal of Employment Counseling 25: 149–59. 
Card, D. 2001. “Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econo-
metric Problems.” Econometrica 69 (5): 1127–60. 
Clogg, C. 1979. Measuring Underemployment: Demographic Indicators for the United 
States. New York: Academic Press.
Clogg, C., and J. Shockey. 1984: “Mismatch Between Occupational, and Schooling: A 
Prevalence Measure, Recent Trends, and Demographic Analysis.” Demography 21 (2): 
235–57.
106  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Cohn, E., and S. P. Khan. 1995. “Th e Wage Eff ects of Overschooling Revisited.” Labour 
Economics 2 (1): 67–76.
de Grip, A., L. L. Borghans, and W. Smits. 1998. “Future Developments in the Job 
Level, and Domain of High–Skilled Workers.” In Towards a Transparent Labor Mar-
ket for Educational Decisions, ed. J. Heijke and L. Borghans, 21–57. Aldershot, U.K.: 
Ashgate.
Esteves, L., and P. Martins. 2007. “Job-Schooling Mismatches and Wages in Brazil.” 
Queen Mary College, University of London.
Freeman, R. B. 1976. Th e Overeducated Americans. New York: Academic Press.
Groot, W. 1996. “Th e Incidence of and Returns to Overeducation in the UK.” Applied 
Economics 28: 1345–50.
Groot, W., and H. Maassen van den Brink. 2000. “Overeducation in the Labor Market: 
A Meta-Analysis.” Economics of Education Review 19 (2): 149–58.
Hartog, J. 1980. “Earnings and Capability Requirements.” Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics 62 (2): 230–40.
———. 2000. “Over-Education and Earnings: Where Are We, Where Should We Go?” 
Economics of Education Review 19 (2): 131–47.
Hecker, D. E. 1992. “Reconciling Confl icting Data on Jobs for College Graduates.” 
Monthly Labour Review 115 (7): 3–12. 
Heckman, J. J. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specifi cation Error.” Econometrica 
47: 153–61.
Herrera, J. 2005. “Sobre y subeducacion en el Peru urbano.” In Cambios globales y el mer-
cado laboral peruano: comercio, legislación, capital humano y empleo, ed. G. Yamada 
and M. Jaramillo, 181–227. Lima: Universidad del Pacifi co.
ILO (International Labour Organization). 1982. “General Report.” 13th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, October.
———. 1993. “Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector.” 
15th International Conference of Labour Statistics, Geneva, January.
———. 1997. “Underemployment: Concept and Measurement.” Report I, Meeting of 
Experts on Labour Statistics, Geneva, October 14–23.
———. 1998. “Report of the Conference.” 16th International Conference of Labour Stat-
isticians, Geneva, October 6–15.
———. 2006. “Regional Labour Market Trends for Youth: Africa.” ILO Youth Employ-
ment Programme, Geneva, September. 
Kuépié M., C. Nordman, and F. Roubaud. 2009. “Education and Earnings in West 
Africa.” Journal of Comparative Economics 37: 491–515. 
Mincer, J. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Robinson, J. 1937. Essays in the Th eory of Employment. London: Macmillan.
Rubb, S. 2003a. “Overeducation: A Short or Long Run Phenomenon for Individuals?” 
Economics of Education Review 22 (4): 389–94.
———. 2003b. “Overeducation in the Labor Market:” A Comment and Re-analysis of a 
Meta-analysis.” Economic of Education Review 22 (6): 6121–29. 
UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND JOB MISMATCH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  107
Sicherman, N. 1991. “Overeducation in the Labor Market.” Journal of Labor Economics 
9 (2): 101–22.
Simon, C., and O. Stark. 2007. “Th e Brain Drain, ‘Educated Unemployment,’ Human 
Capital Formation, and Economic Betterment.” Economics of Transition 15 (4): 629–60.
Spence, M. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (3): 355–74.
Th urow, L. 1975. Generating in Equality: Mechanism of Distribution in the U.S. Economy. 
New York: Basic Books.
Th urow, L. C., and R. Lucas. 1972. Th e American Distribution of Income: A Structural 
Problem. Study for the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Offi  ce. 
UNECA (UN Economic Commission for Africa). 2005. Economic Report on Africa 2005: 
Meeting the Challenges of Unemployment and Poverty in Africa. Addis Ababa: UNECA. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Various years. Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
Verdugo, R., and N. Verdugo. 1989. “Th e Impact of Surplus Schooling on Earnings.” 
Journal of Human Resources 24 (4): 629–43.
World Bank. 2006. “Labor Diagnostics for Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicators, Problems, 
and Data Available.” Technical Note, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2012. World Development Report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank.

© 2013 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / Th e World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org
Some rights reserved
1 2 3 4  16 15 14 13
Th is work is a product of the staff  of Th e World Bank with external contributions. Note that Th e World 
Bank and the Agence Française de Développement do not necessarily own each component of the content 
included in the work. Th e World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement therefore do not 
warrant that the use of the content contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of third parties. 
Th e risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.
Th e fi ndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily refl ect the 
views of Th e World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent, or the 
Agence Française de Développement. Th e World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data 
included in this work. Th e boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map 
in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of Th e World Bank concerning the legal status of any 
territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and 
immunities of Th e World Bank, all of which are specifi cally reserved.
Rights and Permissions
Th is work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY 3.0) http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to 
copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following 
conditions:
Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: De Vreyer, Philippe, and François Roubaud, Editors. 2013. 
Urban Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Development Forum series. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9781-7. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0
Translations—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the 
attribution: Th is translation was not created by Th e World Bank and should not be considered an offi  cial 
World Bank translation. Th e World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.
All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Offi  ce of the Publisher, Th e World Bank, 
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.
ISBN (paper): 978-0-8213-9781-7
ISBN (electronic): 978-0-8213-9782-4
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9781-7
Cover image: ©Michelle Saint-Léger, IRD, 2013. 
Cover design: Debra Naylor, Naylor Design, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Vreyer, Philippe De.
 Urban labor markets in sub-Saharan Africa/Philippe De Vreyer and François Roubaud.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-8213-9781-7 — ISBN 978-0-8213-9782-4 (electronic)
 1. Labor market—Africa, Sub-Saharan. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. 3. City 
dwellers—Employment—Africa, Sub-Saharan. I. Roubaud, François. II. World Bank. III. Title. 
 HD5837.A6V74 2013
 331.120967—dc23
 2012050217
Th e French translation of this book is copublished by Agence Française de Développement and Institut 
de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD). Th e IRD, a French public research institute emphasizing 
interdisciplinarity, has focused its research for more than 65 years on the relationship between man and 
its environment in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and the French tropical overseas ter-
ritories. Its research, training, and innovation activities are intended to contribute to the social, economic, 
and cultural development of southern countries. For further information: www.editions.ird.fr.
